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I. INTRODUCTION
The franchise has gained widespread acceptance as a means of distribut-
ing goods and services. It allows a developer of a product or service to operate
through independent entrepreneurs, thereby reducing capital investment. The
purchaser of a franchise benefits by sharing in the profits from the system.
The close cooperation between franchisor and franchisee, necessary to make
the system work smoothly, usually is reached through restraints imposed by
the franchisor.
Antitrust law is perhaps most commonly associated with the franchisor-
franchisee relationship. Many cases describe liability in this relationship
through such concepts as tie-ins, resale price maintenance, and other vertical
restraints. Injuries that third parties suffer, however, are not always caused by
antitrust violations. They often arise from the commission of a tort or breach
of contract by the franchisee. The injured party, searching for the deep pocket,
seeks to impose liability on the franchisor using traditional agency concepts,
negligence, and strict liability. This Article will explore some notable vicarious
liability cases and articulate a defense based upon the Lanham Act (Act),1 as
well as examine the emerging direct liability theories applied to franchisors.
* Mr. Monica is a partner with Shook, Hardy & Bacon, in Kansas City, Mis-
souri, who specializes in franchise and antitrust law. Anne E. Goos, an associate at
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, collaborated with Mr. Monica on this Article.
1. Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-1127 (1982)). The purpose of the Act is to ensure the integrity of registered
trademarks and tradenames. Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th
Cir. 1979).
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II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A. Agency and Apparent Authority
Plaintiffs frequently argue that the franchisee is an agent of the
franchisor. This theory will be successful only if the franchisee was in fact an
agent of the franchisor, and not merely an independent contractor.2 The plain-
tiff must prove that the franchisor actually controlled or had a right to control
the franchisee's conduct.
Agency is "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other to so act."'3 An independent contractor is
"one who contracts to do something for another, but is not controlled by the
other or subject to the other's right to control" and for whose acts the other is
not responsible.4 Control of or the right to control" the means and manner of
performance (as opposed to the ultimate result) distinguishes an agent from an
independent contractor. Characterizing the agent as an independent contractor
or disclaiming agency in a written contract is not dispositive of the question. It
is the element of control in the relationship between the parties that is
important.6
Under the actual agency theory, a franchisor that sufficiently controls or
reserves the right to control the franchisee may be vicariously liable for its
franchisee's acts. This presents franchisors with a dilemma. A certain degree
of control is inherent and necessary in the relationship. The franchisor spends
a considerable amount of time and money developing its product or service,
which is often publicly identified with a recognized trademark or tradename.
The franchisor knows that success depends upon consumer acceptance of the
product and trademark. This acceptance depends on the franchisee's opera-
tion. Thus, most franchisors have a keen interest in regulating the perform-
ance of their franchisees.
Absent an actual agency relationship, the franchisor may still be vicari-
ously liable for the acts of its franchisee under an apparent authority theory.
Plaintiffs often assert both theories, because factors that may support a finding
of actual agency in a particular case, such as use of the franchisor's logo or
2. Although an independent contractor by definition is not a servant, he may
be an agent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) & comment b (1958). In this
Article, the term "independent contractor" is given its colloquial meaning, excluding
the independent contractor from the category of agent. See id. § 14N comment a.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
4. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Continental Shippers Ass'n, 485 F. Supp.
1314, 1316 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
5. Steele v. Armour & Co., 583 F.2d 393, 396-97 (8th Cir. 1978).
6. Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1343 n.7 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Ottensmeyer v. Baskin, 625 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Ha-
waii Ct. App. 1981).
[Vol. 49
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uniformity of architecture and decor, may also be considered in finding appar-
ent authority. 7
In most jurisdictions, apparent authority is created when the supposed
principal causes a third party to reasonably believe that the supposed agent
has the power to act on the principal's behalf, and the third party relies on the
appearance of agency. 8 The benefit of apparent authority is extended only to
third parties who reasonably believe that authority exists because of appear-
ances and who act in reliance thereon. The third party must deal in good faith
with the agent on the face of the "holding out" by the supposed principal,
reasonably believing that the agent has authority.
Apparent authority must arise from the acts of the alleged principal and
not from acts of the agent; an agent cannot create his own authority.9 A per-
son dealing with a supposed agent has a duty to ascertain the agent's author-
ity, for the law does not presume that agency exists. 10 Apparent authority is
not established merely because a plaintiff claims that he believed authority
was present or because it looked so to him and he acted on his conclusions."'
7. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 795 (3d Cir.
1978); Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167, 176 (5th Cir. 1975); Jordan v. Robert
Half Personnel Agencies, 615 S.W.2d 574, 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). See generally
Germain, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors in an Era of "Accountability" A
Tale of Three Cases, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 128 (1979).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 27 (1958); see also Wynn v.
McMahon Ford Co., 414 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). Agency by estoppel
requires that the person dealing with the purported agent change his position in reason-
able reliance upon a manifestation of authority by the purported principal. Dudley v.
Dumont, 526 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Agency by estoppel is a tort
theory, while apparent authority is a contract theory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 8 comment d (1958).
9. Jeff-Cole Quarries v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 13 (Mo. 1970); Dudley v. Du-
mont, 526 S.W.2d 839, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Fielder v. Production Credit Ass'n,
429 S.W.2d 307, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). Apparent authority may be created when
the purported principal acquiesces in acts of the purported agent indicating an agency
relationship. See Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 796 (3d Cir.
1978) (question of fact whether franchisor who had unqualified right to inspect fran-
chisee's premises had actual or constructive knowledge of franchisee's failure to hold
itself out as the independent owner); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 43, 49
(1958).
The franchisor should not be liable to an injured third party on an apparent au-
thority theory in cases involving purely fortuitous torts, such as automobile accidents.
The plaintiff cannot be said to have reasonably relied on any representations by the
franchisor in encountering the franchisee. See Steele v. Armour & Co., 583 F.2d 393,
398 (8th Cir. 1978); McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 164 Conn. 317, 322, 321
A.2d 456, 460 (1973). But cf. Fernander v. Thigpen, 278 S.C. 140, ._, 293 S.E.2d
424, 426 (1982) (franchisee's former employee killed in an accident while riding home
from work with franchisee's assistant manager allowed to sue franchisor based on ap-
parent authority).
10. Dudley v. Dumont, 526 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Erickson v.
Civic Plaza Nat'l Bank, 422 S.W.2d 373, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
11. Wyler Watch Agency, Inc. v. Hooker, 280 S.W.2d 849, 854 (Mo. Ct. App.
3
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Many courts have found the appearance or "holding out" of an agency
relationship in the franchisor-franchisee context. Use of a trademark or trade
name, advertising, distinctive architectural design, decor, employee uniforms,
and other manifestations of uniformity lead consumers to believe that they are
dealing with the franchisor.12 The willingness of the courts to find an agency
relationship based on apparent authority underscores a danger inherent in the
franchising concept. 13 One of the greatest strengths of a franchise-public rec-
ognition of the trademark or name and the quality and uniformity associated
with it-may become its greatest weakness: a manifestation of agency.
Certain factors frequently give rise to an agency relationship between the
franchisor and franchisee. No one factor is controlling; the cumulative effect
1955); see also Erickson v. Civic Plaza Nat'l Bank, 422 S.W.2d 373, 380 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1967) (test is whether a person of ordinary prudence is justified in presuming
agent's authority).
12. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 790 (3d Cir.
1978); Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167, 176 (5th Cir. 1975); Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.,
437 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971). But see Cullen v.
BMW of N. Am., 531 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (no agency by estoppel shown
where plaintiff's reliance was a belief that logo and other manifestations represented
quality of products), rev'd on other grounds, 691 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 103
S. Ct. 1525 (1983); B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 634, 370 A.2d 554, 556
(1977) (defendant's use of logo and colors does not create apparent authority); Ortega
v. General Motors Corp., 392 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (signs advertis-
ing that dealer sold GMC products did not lead to the inference of agency); Stephens
v. Yamaha Motor Co., 627 P.2d 439, 440 (Okla. 1981) (signs and advertisements did
not lead to conclusion that service station's tire repair services were authorized). See
generally Borchard & Ehrlich, Franchisor Tort Liability: Minimizing the Potential
Liability of a Franchisor for a Franchisee's Torts, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 109, 114-16
(1979).
Service stations and automobile dealers may be unique because it is "common
knowledge" that trademarks are displayed by these independent dealers. Reynolds v.
Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 171, 287 N.W. 823, 827 (1939); Diaz v. GIMAC Ma-
rina, Inc., [1983] Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 7916, at 13,433 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 7, 1983) (no agency found where oil company did not hire, train, or compensate
service station employees and station was not bound to sell company's products); see
also Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 796 n.23 (3d Cir. 1978)
(advertising bearing oil company's name does not alone raise an agency issue for the
jury).
13. In Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 976, 54 Cal. Rptr. 328
(1966), the court disregarded the franchisor's reasonable effort to avoid the appearance
of agency between itself and its franchisee. The franchise agreement required the fran-
chisee to "conspicuously" display a sign that identified it as a licensee solely responsible
for its own acts. Id. at 978, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The court found apparent agency
even though the plaintiff did not show that she believed that the franchisee was the
agent of the franchisor. Agency was found because no one told the plaintiff that the
franchisee owned the business nor called her attention to the disclaimer. Id. at 979, 54
Cal. Rptr. at 330; see also McDonald v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., [1983] Bus.
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 7975, at 13,629 (Wis. Ct. App. April 4, 1983) (plaintiffs
reasonably relied on their "impression" that the franchisee represented the franchisor
despite disclaimers in contracts and advertising).
[Vol. 49
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of the factors present is considered. Some of the pertinent factors include the
franchisor's right to control or control over the day-to-day details of the fran-
chisee's business operation, including: the hiring, firing, wages, benefits, pro-
motions, uniforms, or training of the franchisee's employees;14 prices the fran-
chisee will charge its customers;' 5 financial methods and record-keeping or
reporting requirements;' 6 quantity and quality of goods on hand or form of
14. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchise agreement required franchisee to exercise best efforts to secure union
labor and utilize franchisor's uniforms); Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App.
2d 610, 615, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1967) (agreement conferred on franchisor the
right to control employment of all franchisee's employees); Singleton v. International
Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 162 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (agreement required all fran-
chisee employees to wear franchisor-approved uniforms); Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo.
1107, 1116, 131 S.W.2d 533, 538 (1939) (dealership agreement required dealer's em-
ployees to wear oil company's uniforms). But see Ortega v. General Motors Corp., 392
So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (no agency found even though agreement
required that franchisee's employees be trained by franchisor, but did not allow
franchisor to regulate the franchisee in their hiring, firing, or supervision); Holiday
Inns v. Newton, 157 Ga. App. 436, 437, 278 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1981) (no agency found
where agreement did not give franchisor control over franchisee's employees or other
details of the franchisee's business); Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 716, 727, 413 N.E.2d 457, 465 (1980) (no agency found where agreement
allowed for training and supervision of franchisee's restaurant managers, training stan-
dards, and promotions); Coty v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 58 II1. App. 3d 237,
240, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1374 (1978) (no agency found where franchisor could not hire
or fire employees, could not stop work in the restaurant immediately, and could not
give any orders to franchisee's employees, and where the franchisor's only remedy on
the franchisee's breach of any franchise covenant was to terminate the entire franchise
agreement); B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 635, 370 A.2d 554, 557 (1977) (no
agency or apparent authority found where franchisee hired, fired, and paid his own
employees, and provided his own uniforms); Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623
S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (no agency found where franchisee hired, su-
pervised, and paid his own employees, even though franchisor provided employee train-
ing services, and required uniforms and other employment practices); Murphy v. Holi-
day Inns, 216 Va. 490, -, 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1975) (no agency found even
though agreement required franchisor training of certain franchisee staff members and
prohibited employment of persons engaged in competitive businesses).
15. See, e.g., Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. 2d 610, 615, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 728, 732 (1967) (agreement gave franchisor right to fix the minimum rates
charged franchisee's clients); Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 1116, 131 S.W.2d 533,
538 (1939) (service station franchisee required to sell products at oil company's prices);
cf. Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, -, 219 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1975) (agree-
ments did not vest franchisors with power to dictate the prices charged by the
franchisees).
16. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (agreement required franchisee to maintain inventory control data and records
as specified by the franchisor, to use the franchisor's accounting system, and make
monthly financial reports); Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 610, 615, 56
Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1967) (franchisor had power to select the financial institution
handling, financing, or discounting of all pupil installment contracts, and franchisee
was required to maintain and report certain records to franchisor); Billops v. Magness
Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (factual issue as to whether there was an
5
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inventory control;17 required insurance;18 maintenance standards and proce-
dures;19 hours and days of operation;20 forms and stationery;2' suppliers; 22 and
agency relationship where agreement required franchisee to maintain various detailed
records to insure compliance with the franchisor's operations manual); Singleton v. In-
ternational Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 162 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (franchisee re-
quired to maintain certain records and make monthly reports to the franchisor); Becker
v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 1116, 131 S.W.2d 533, 538 (1939) (service station fran-
chisee could extend credit only to those customers approved by franchisor); cf B.P. Oil
Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 635, 370 A.2d 554, 557 (1977) (no agency relationship
found where franchisee was not required to make reports). But see Ortega v. General
Motors Corp., 392 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (no agency relationship
found where agreement required franchisee to follow a uniform system of accounting
specified by the franchisor); Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App. 3d
716, 727, 413 N.E.2d 457, 465 (1980) (no agency relationship found where agreement
required franchisee to maintain certain recordkeeping and account controls); Stanford
v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (no agency found
where agreement prescribed method of keeping financial records for franchisor); Mur-
phy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, -, 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1975) (no agency rela-
tionship found where franchisee was required to submit quarterly reports to
franchisor).
17. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchisor designated inventory requirements, prohibited supplementation of in-
ventory without the franchisor's written consent, and required maintenance and deliv-
ery of control data); Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978)
(franchisor required minimum supplies of brand name goods); Singleton v. Interna-
tional Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 162 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (franchisor dictated
items that could be sold). But see Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 716, 727, 413 N.E.2d 457, 465 (1980) (no agency relationship found where
franchisee could sell only the products approved in writing by the franchisor); Stanford
v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797, 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (no agency rela-
tionship found where agreement encouraged operator not to sell "incompatible" items,
such as beer).
18. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchisee required to purchase and maintain policies prescribed by the
franchisor, naming the franchisor as an insured, and if franchisee failed to do so, the
franchisor could purchase such insurance on the franchisee's behalf and at its cost);
Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (operations manual
detailed insurance requirements); cf. Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 716, 720, 413 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1980) (no agency found where each fran-
chisee was expected to have its own insurance).
19. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchisee required to maintain premises and the merchandise displays in cer-
tain ways); Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1975) (agreement re-
quired franchisee to build and maintain facility as specified by franchisor); Billops v.
Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (operations manual regulated
engineering and maintenance); cf. Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, -, 219
S.E.2d 874, 877-78 (1975) (no agency found where franchisor lacked power to control
daily maintenance of franchisee's premises). But see Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods.,
623 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (no agency found where franchisee was
required to abide by approved sanitation and food preparation procedures).
20. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchise agreement required franchisee to be open a minimum of 46 hours per
week); cf B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, -, 370 A.2d 554, 557 (1977) (no
6
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portions served.2 3
Equally important are the franchisor's right to control: the location, lay-
out, and decor of the franchisee's premises;24 inspection of the franchisee's
premises or books;25 a share of the franchisee's profits rather than a simple
agency found where franchisor lacked control over hours of operation). But see Ortega
v. General Motors Corp., 392 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (no agency
found where agreement required franchisee to remain open for business during times
according to community custom); Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 I11.
App. 3d 716, 727, 413 N.E.2d 457, 465 (1980) (no agency found where agreement
required franchisee to observe the hours specified in franchisor's manual); Coty v.
United States Slicing Mach. Co., 58 I11. App. 3d 237, 240, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1374
(1978) (no agency found where agreement set minimum hours and days of service).
21. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchisee required to use franchisor's standard forms).
22. See, e.g., Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 162 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1975) (franchisor had power to approve suppliers of "mixes"; franchisee re-
quired to purchase other supplies from franchisor-approved suppliers or manufactur-
ers); cf. Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(no agency found where franchisee could purchase its meat from any source). But see
Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App. 3d 716, 727, 413 N.E.2d 457,
465 (1980) (no agency relationship found where agreement required franchisee to
purchase all flour and mixes only from the franchisor or from suppliers approved in
writing by the franchisor, and required franchisee to comply with a manual that in-
cluded requirements concerning suppliers).
23. See, e.g., Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 162 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1975) (agreement gave franchisor power to dictate portion control).
24. See, e.g., Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1975) (agree-
ment required franchisee to build and maintain facility as specified by the franchisor);
Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir. 1978) (agreement
required franchisee to adhere to the franchisor's standards concerning interior and ex-
terior colors, lighting, design, equipment, and fixtures, and to conform with standards
concerning new construction and facilities); Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal.
App. 2d 610, 615, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1967) (agreement gave franchisor right to
control location, layout, and decoration of franchisee's studio); Singleton v. Interna-
tional Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 161 (Del Super. Ct. 1975) (franchisee required to
construct premises according to franchisor's specifications). But see Ortega v. General
Motors Corp., 392 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (no agency found where
agreement required franchisee to obtain franchisor's approval of premises location and
design); Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(no agency where franchisor required blueprints for "suitable building"); Murphy v.
Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, , 219 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1975) (no agency where agree-
ment empowered franchisor to regulate architectural style, furnishings, and
equipment).
25. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir.
1978) (agreement gave franchisor right to inspect the franchisee's premises and records
at any reasonable time); Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1975)
(agreement required franchisee to permit regular franchisor inspection of facilities);
Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (agreement gave
franchisor right to inspect premises); Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d
160, 161 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (same). But see Whitfield v. Century 21 Real Estate
Corp., 484 F. Supp. 984, 986 (S.D. Texas 1979) (no agency found where agreement
gave licensor right to conduct annual audits); Harwell v. Sheraton Gardens Inn, [1981]
7
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royalty fee;26 the franchisee's business expenses, taxes, or claims against the
franchisee;2 7 local and national advertising 28 or requiring payments by the
Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 7626, at 12,533 (N.D. Ga. July 29, 1977) (no agency
found where franchisor had power to make quarterly inspection of premises); Slates v.
International House of Pancakes, 90 II. App. 3d 716, 720, 413 N.E.2d 457, 461
(1980) (franchisor had right to conduct periodic inspections of premises); Stanford v.
Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (franchisor con-
ducted periodic inspections); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, -, 219 S.E.2d
874, 877 (1975) (franchisee required to submit to periodic inspections of facilities and
procedures).
26. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 786 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchisor received monthly 4% royalty from franchisee's gross receipts); Nich-
ols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1967)
(franchisor received weekly payments of 5% of franchisee's gross receipts); cf. Harwell
v. Sheraton Gardens Inn, [1981] Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 7626, at 12,553
(N.D. Ga. July 29, 1977) (no agency found where franchisee was obligated to make
monthly payments because the fee was not dependent on number of rooms rented or
franchisee's profit); Ortega v. General Motors Corp., 392 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (no agency found where franchisor did not share in franchisee's profits or
losses, without any discussion of the fee arrangement between franchisee and
franchisor); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, __, 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1975)
(no agency found where franchisee paid a flat licensing fee and franchisor had no
power to demand share of franchisee's profits). But see Whitfield v. Century 21 Real
Estate Corp., 484 F. Supp. 984, 986 (S.D. Texas 1979) (no agency found where licen-
sor received percentage of the gross receipts of its licensee derived from percentage of
the gross income received from the licensee's franchisee).
27. See, e.g., Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615, 56
Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1967) (franchisor had the right to make refunds); cf. Ortega v.
General Motors Corp., 392 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (no agency where
agreement stated that franchisee was solely responsible for all expenditures and obliga-
tions); Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App. 3d 716, 413 N.E.2d 457
(1980) (no agency where franchisee was responsible for paying claims against it, and
franchisor did not defend the franchisee, give any instructions concerning claims, or
require that the franchisee inform the franchisor in case of an accident or claim); B.P.
Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 554 (1977) (no agency found where fran-
chisee paid for its own products and taxes); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, 219
S.E.2d 874 (1975) (no agency found where franchisor did not control or pay fran-
chisee's business expenditures).
28. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787-88 (3d
Cir. 1978) (franchisee required to use and pay for all promotional materials developed
by the franchisor and to submit other materials to franchisor for prior written ap-
proval); Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728,
732 (1967) (franchisor required franchisee to submit all advertising for prior approval);
Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (manual regulated
advertising by franchisee); Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 162
(Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (agreement specified manner of marking advertising cartons
and containers). But see Ortega v. General Motors Corp., 392 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (no agency found where agreement required signs recommended by the
franchisor); Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App. 716, 727, 413
N.E.2d 457, 465 (1980) (no agency found where agreement required franchisee to
comply with advertising standards); Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797,
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franchisee to a national advertising fund. 9 Finally, the courts look at the
franchisor's right to terminate the relationship upon the franchisee's breach of
any covenant in the franchisee agreement 0 and the franchisor's broad discre-
tionary power over the franchisee.-3
B. Using The Lanham Act to Defend Against an Assertion of Agency
Most of the cases discussing these factors do not even address the control
required by the Lanham Act, let alone attempt to reconcile the requirements
of the Act with traditional agency concepts. Usually franchisors do not even
raise the Act as a defense. The few courts that have considered the Act in
agency terms have concluded that the control exercised by the particular
franchisor was necessary under the Act and therefore did not create a princi-
pal-agent relationship. 2
Apart from the inherent need to regulate to maintain consumer accept-
ance, the franchisor is required by statute to exercise a certain degree of con-
trol over franchisees using its trademark. The Act requires that the licensor of
a registered mark (or name) exercise control over the nature and quality of
29. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787-88 (3d
Cir. 1978) (franchisee required to pay for franchisor-developed promotional materials).
But see Coty v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 237, 240, 373 N.E.2d
1371, 1374 (1978) (no agency found where franchisee was required to finance and
participate in advertising programs); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, -, 219
S.E.2d 874, 876 (1975) (no agency found where franchisee was required to pay contin-
uing fee for national advertising).
30. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchisor had power to terminate agreement if the franchisee breached any
provision); Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1975) (franchisor could
cancel agreement upon any substantial violation); Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391
A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) ("right of unilateral termination for violation given the
franchisor"); Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160, 161-62 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1975) (franchisor had right to cancel the agreement for "many reasons");
Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 1115, 131 S.W.2d 533, 538 (1939) (oil company had
power to terminate on 10 days notice). But see Harwell v. Sheraton Gardens Inn,
[1981] Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 7626, at 12,553 (N.D. Ga. July 29, 1977) (no
agency where franchisor did not have power to affect franchisee's operation, and its
only option was to terminate); Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App.
3d 716, 749, 413 N.E.2d 457, 460 (1980) (no agency where there was testimony that
franchisor had no grounds to enforce compliance with manuals); Coty v. United States
Slicing Mach. Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 237, 240, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1374 (1978) (no agency
where franchisor's only remedy for breach was to terminate entire agreement).
31. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir.
1978) (franchisee required to conduct business in a manner reflecting favorably on the
franchisor); Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615, 56 Cal. Rptr.
728, 732 (1967) (franchisee required to conduct, maintain, and manage business in
accordance with franchisor's policies). See generally Borchard & Ehrlich, supra note
12, at 110-13 (various factors supporting inference of control).
32. See Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322 (7th Cir. 1979); Murphy
v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, 219 S.E.2d 874 (1975).
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goods or services used under the mark.33 This duty is imposed to guarantee
that the goods or services offered by the licensee are similar to goods and
services sold under the mark before the licensing, and that the mark has the
meaning it had before licensing. 4
Because there is a duty to maintain the integrity of the trademark, the
licensor must attempt to discover any misleading or deceptive uses by monitor-
ing the licensee's operations. 5 Although the amount of supervision a licensor
must exercise is not specified by the Act, a licensor is required to exercise
control sufficient to ensure uniform quality of the product or service.36 If this
control is not exercised, the licensor may be deemed to have abandoned the
mark, and the mark's value is lost.3 7
The question is how much control the licensor can exercise over the licen-
see without creating an agency relationship. There is authority that mere com-
pliance with the Act by the licensor does not create a principal-agent relation-
ship with the licensee.38 Each case must be reviewed on an individual basis to
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1982) provides: "Where a registered mark or a mark
sought to be registered is or may be used legitimately by related companies,. . . such
use shall not affect the validity of such mark or of its registration, provided such mark
is not used in such'manner as to deceive the public." A related company is "any person
who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant . . . in respect to the nature
and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." Id. §
1127. See generally Comment, Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Con-
trol, 1968 DUKE L.J. 875, 887-900.
34. Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d
1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
206 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affid, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp.
796, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
35. Huntington Nat'l Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp., 201 F. Supp. 938, 945(D. Md. 1962) (owner had affirmative duty to police activities of licensee to assure that
licensee applies mark to a product of substantially similar quality).
36. Id.; see Lahart, Control-The Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark Li-
cense, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 103 (1960); Note, Liability of a Franchisor for Acts of the
Franchisee, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 143, 148-49 (1968).
37. A similar result may follow under the Missouri trademark statute, Mo.
REv. STAT. § 417.041(4)(a) (1978), which provides for the cancellation of a trademark
because of abandonment.
38. The Lanham Act "does not give a licensor control over the day-to-day oper-
ations of a licensee beyond that necessary to ensure uniform quality of the product or
service in question . . . [nor does it] automatically saddle the licensor with the respon-
sibilities under state law of a principal for his agent." Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp.,
596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979). In Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d
797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), the court affirmed a finding that no actual agency existed,
partially because the contractual requirements relative to the franchisee's Operations
were "rather directly" related to calculating and verifying the royalty fee owed and to
maintaining the value of the trade name. The court also found that the purpose of tjf'e
franchise agreement, as far as the franchisor was concerned, was to exploit ownership
of the exclusive right to license others to use its trade name while preserving the value
of the name in the market place. Id. at 802-03. The Lanham Act was not mentioned.
[Vol. 49
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determine whether the licensor has gone beyond the requirements of the Act
in exercising control.3 9
The control necessary to avoid trademark abandonment is commensurate
with that required to protect the integrity of the registered mark or name and
to prevent public deception. 40 The duty to supervise does not give the licensor
the right to control the day-to-day details of the licensee's business beyond
what is necessary to ensure uniform quality of the product or service sold
under the trademark.4' Supervision aimed at protecting the mark, however,
may necessarily infringe on some day-to-day details of the franchisee's opera-
tion. This infringement alone should not subject a licensor to liability under
agency principles.
The control which courts have deemed necessary to avoid abandonment of
a registered mark. and, thus, which should be tolerated without imposing the
burden of agency on the licensor, includes the following:42
1. Supervision over advertising, providing advertising, or specifying the
advertising the licensee may utilize.43 This supervision is readily accepted, par-
ticularly when it is confined to use of the trademark; some supervision of ad-
vertising is necessary to prevent misuse of the mark and deception of the pub-
lic. The use of the trademark and the opportunity to benefit from the public's
recognition of it is one of the most valuable benefits of franchising. 44 Advertis-
ing builds and maintains that public recognition.45 Uncontrolled advertising
could easily change recognition of the mark, mislead the public, and severely
damage goodwill.
2. Inspection of the licensee's operations or premises. In Dawn Donut
Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,46 the court found that the Act mandated regular
inspections by the licensor.47 Periodic inspections should not alone create an
agency relationship. The appearance of the premises from which the trade-
39. Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, __, 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1975).
40. See Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979).
41. Id.; Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549
F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).
42. There is a conflict between the list which follows and the agency factors set
out in text accompanying notes 14-31 supra. This is because the Lanham Act has
seldom been raised by franchisors facing vicarious liability claims and because the
courts have adopted a case by case approach to considering vicarious liability.
43. See, e.g., Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.
1979); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afd, 332
F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1959); Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta
Assoc., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
44. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
45. 206 F. Supp. at 641.
46. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
47. "[T]he only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is used
by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable
manner the activities of his licensees." Id. at 366-67.
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marked product or service is delivered to the public is important to maintain-
ing the quality of the trademark.
3. Control over supplies or suppliers. Franchisors who have sought to
exercise control over the quality of their franchisee's supplies in compliance
with the Act have often faced claims that the control constitutes an illegal
tying arrangement. The Act demands supervision, while the antitrust laws ab-
hor control. The courts have resolved these conflicting policies by interpreting
the antitrust laws to permit the franchisor to exercise enough control over its
franchisee to protect its trademark.
In McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc.,48 the franchisor
(AAMCO) required its franchisees to purchase parts from it or from those
vendors determined by AAMCO to offer parts of "equal quality." The
franchisor periodically inspected franchisees to ensure that they were using
quality parts. In addressing this control over product selection, the court rec-
ognized that permitting inferior products to be presented to the public under
the mark might constitute misuse. Thus, AAMCO "had the right, if not the
duty, to establish a minimum 'equal quality' standard for the transmission
parts used by its franchisees."40
In Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,50 the
franchisor required its franchisees to purchase from approved sources supplies,
such as containers and napkins, carrying the franchisor's trademark. Kentucky
Fried Chicken set minimum standards for the supplies, and other suppliers
meeting these standards could be approved. The court agreed that this require-
ment did not violate the antitrust laws because it was necessary to control
quality51 in a manner necessary and sufficient to meet the requirements of the
Act. 52
In Susser v. Carvel Corp.,5 3 the court held that the franchisor was enti-
tled to designate dairies to supply the ice cream mix used by its franchisees, as
well as the suppliers of closely related accessories, such as toppings, cones, and
paper goods. This quality control was deemed necessary under the Act.54 A
similar result was reached in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.55
The policy considerations present in the Lanham Act-agency conflict are
similar to those involved in the Lanham Act-antitrust dichotomy. Therefore,
48. 461 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978); cf. Diaz v. GIMAC Marina, Inc.,
[1983] Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 7916, at 13,433 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 1983)
(no agency found where franchisee not required to purchase products from franchisor
oil company).
49. 461 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
50. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 380-81.
52. Id. at 387.
53. 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
54. 206 F. Supp. at 641.
55. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 49320
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the approach in examining the amount of supervision which will be tolerated
should be the same: the supervision required by the Act should be accepted
without finding the existence of an agency relationship.56
4. Prohibition against sale or transfer of the licensee. This type of provi-
sion is customary in trademark licensing agreements and shows that the licen-
sor is concerned with having its licenses in the hands of only those persons or
firms of the highest character.5" It should not give rise to an agency
relationship. 58
5. Transfer of ownership of the trademark license to the licensor on de-
fault or bankruptcy of the licensee.59
6. Limitations on the type of products that may be sold or services
which may be offered. A trademark licensor must guard against being forced
by its franchisees to enter into or lend its name to lines of business other than
that embodied by the trademark.60 If a franchisor were powerless to prevent
its licensees from selling products or offering services other than those origi-
nally connected with the trademark, the public would be misled, and the licen-
sor would not have met its duty under the Act.
7. Inspection of the licensee's books and records. In certain types of ser-
vice-related franchises where there is no tangible product, such as an employ-
ment agency specializing only in certain areas of employment,61 inspection
may be needed to ensure that the franchisee is limiting its business to the
specialized areas represented by the trademark or name.
8. Right to demand a certified financial statement. By demanding
financial statements, the licensor can ensure that the licensee is financially
competent to continue providing quality goods or services under its license.
The financially troubled licensee who cannot provide such goods or services
will reflect adversely on the quality and integrity associated with the -trade-
mark or name. For example, one court found a franchisor negligent for failing
to sufficiently supervise its franchisee's operation so as to avoid subjecting the
franchisee's customers to an unreasonable risk of financial injury at the hands
56. A similar argument was ignored in Meyers v. Coca-Cola Co., [1983] Bus.
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) T 8004, at 13,717 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Mar. 14, 1983), where the
franchisor sought to avoid vicarious liability by pointing out that the quality control it
exercised was mandated by state-imposed bottling standards. Deeming the vicarious
liability issue as one for the jury, the court only mentioned that the franchisor raised
the state-imposed standards and did not comment upon their significance. The fact that
the franchisor prescribed written cleanliness standards dealing with bottling appeared
to be the overriding consideration.
57. Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1149-50
(N.D. II1. 1972).
58. Id.
59. Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1979).
60. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
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of a financially troubled franchise.62
9. Periodic reports. Periodic reports may serve a dual purpose. First, as
with the right to inspect the licensee's books and records, such reports help the
licensor determine whether the licensee is limiting its business to the special-
ized area represented by the trade name or mark. Second, if the royalty ar-
rangement is a percentage fee, periodic reports may reveal how much the li-
censee owes the licensor for use of the trademark or name. The trademark or
name is valuable property, the use of which entitles the licensor to compensa-
tion. The licensor who fails to treat the mark as a valuable property right by
failing to monitor and demand just compensation may be accused of aban-
doning the mark. 3
10. Right to terminate the licensing agreement. This right is the logical
extension of the other methods of necessary supervision discussed, particularly
supervision over advertising, inspection (of premises and records), and reports.
A licensor could not effectively maintain the integrity of its mark if it were
powerless to terminate a licensee who is unwilling or unable to comply with
the provisions of the licensing agreement, particularly those concerning the use
of the trademark or name.
Using the Act as a defense to a claim of vicarious liability probably re-
quires pleading it as an affirmative defense. 4 The problem is effectively plac-
ing the Act before the court and jury. Upon request, a court may take judicial
notice of a federal statute.68 Once a court takes judicial notice of the Act, the
Act can then be embodied in the verdict directing and affirmative defense jury
instructions.
This is not the way to impress a jury with facts showing that the licensor
did no more than was necessary to comply with the Act. One solution may be
to call as an expert witness an attorney who specializes in trademark law. It is
not settled, however, to what extent an attorney may testify as an expert on
the law. Expert testimony concerning what law governs the case is improper.6 8
Thus, in many jurisdictions it is doubtful that an expert would be permitted to
testify directly as to what the Act requires or to state an opinion as to whether
the franchisor exercised more control than that required by the Act. This may
not entirely preclude expert legal testimony. An expert may respond to hypo-
62. Cullen v. BMW of N. Am., 531 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y.) (unforeseen crim-
inal acts of the franchisee constituted an intervening cause relieving the franchisor of
liability), rev'd, 691 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1982).
63. Cf. Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981) (no agency found where licensing agreement operation requirements were
"rather directly" related to calculating the royalty payable to the licensor or to main-
taining value of licensor's trade name-Lanham Act not discussed).
64. See Parker v. Pine, 617 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); McDowell
v. Schuette, 610 S.W.2d 29, 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.08.
65. Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo. 662, 679, 46 S.W.2d 591, 599 (1931);
Redman v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 187 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
66. State v. Ballard, 394 S.W.2d 336, 339-40 (Mo. 1965).
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thetical questions concerning standards of ordinary practice in an industry
with which he is familiar and their relationship to the facts of a particular
case. 67 A trademark attorney should be permitted to testify as to the steps
normally taken by trademark licensors in an industry to protect trademarks,
and that the steps taken by the particular defendant to protect its trademark,
including the control exercised over licensees, are consistent with the normal
practice in the industry.68
III. DIRECT LIABILITY
A. Negligence
A few cases have analyzed the franchisor's liability to an injured third
party on negligence principles. In Coty v. United States Slicing Machine
Co.,69 the plaintiff, an employee of the franchisee-restaurant owner, was in-
jured while operating the franchisee's meat slicing machine. The employee
sued the franchisor on the theory of negligent supervision of its franchisee
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 414,70 which imposes a duty to
use reasonable care in supervising an independent contractor (franchisee) over
whom control in the performance of the work is retained. The trial court
67. Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509 (2d Cir. 1977); Re-
public Tech. Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540, 552 (2d Cir. 1973); Minnesota
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 312 F.2d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1963); Parker v. Stern Bros.
& Co., 499 S.W.2d 397, 410 (Mo. 1973); cf. E.I. duPont de Nemours, Inc. v. Berkley
& Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1272 (8th Cir. 1980) (patent attorney's opinion inadmissible).
68. In Jordan v. Robert Half Personnel Agencies, 615 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981), the court dealt with the issue of agency in the franchisor-franchisee con-
text. Jordan sued the local franchisee for tortious interference with contract and breach
of fiduciary relationship. He sought to recover against the franchisor on theories of
actual agency and apparent authority. The trial court dismissed the franchisor because
Jordan failed to introduce sufficient evidence of an agency relationship. Id. at 582. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that Jordan should have been al-
lowed to submit the agency issue to the jury. Id.
Jordan is not particularly instructive. The court merely found that the plaintiff
had adduced sufficient evidence to warrant submitting the question of agency to the
jury. It did not determine whether the elements of control made the franchisee an
agent. There was little differentiation by the court between actual agency and apparent
authority beyond noting that the plaintiff had advanced both theories. The court dis-
cussed only one case at any length, concentrating solely on that case's examination of
apparent authority issues. Id.; see Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1975).
Because the parties did not raise the issue, the court did not consider the Lanham Act.
Thus, the opinion tends to leave the misleading impression that the types of controls
exercised by the franchisor or which the franchisor had a right to exercise were, with-
out more, sufficient to impose an agency relationship.
69. 58 I1l. App. 3d 237, 373 N.E.2d 1371 (1978).
70. (1965). The plaintiff also proceeded against the franchisor on a theory of
willful and wanton misconduct. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the manufac-
turer was affirmed. 58 II!. App. 3d at 243, 373 N.E.2d at 1380.
1984]
15
Monica: Monica: Franchisor Liability to Third Parties
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
granted the franchisor a directed verdict. 71
Coty contended that: the franchisor controlled the operations of its fran-
chisee; was aware that the franchisee's minor employees were operating the
slicing machine; knew of the applicable state and federal statutes prohibiting
the operation of such machines by minors; and had the power under the
franchise agreement to prevent such activities. 2 Coty further argued that the
franchisor's responsibility for its breach of duty to prevent such activities
should have been submitted to the jury. The evidence indicated that the
franchisor was aware of the federal standards and of the franchisee's failure to
conform with them.7 3
An Illinois appellate court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict on
the ground that the franchisor had not retained sufficient control over the
manner in which the franchisee's work was done to be liable for negligent
supervision." The franchise agreement imposed a number of restrictions on
the franchisee concerning the general operation of the restaurant, including
the franchisee's covenant to comply with all applicable federal, state, county,
and city laws, ordinances, and regulations.7 5 The court noted that these "re-
strictions were principally geared towards protecting the . . . trademark and
the good will associated with it."'7 6 The franchisor did not, however, retain
day-to-day supervisory control, could not hire, fire, or give orders to any of the
franchisee's employees, and could not halt work immediately in the restaurant.
The franchisor's only remedy, on breach of any of the covenants contained in
the franchise agreement, was to terminate the agreement after giving ten days
written notice to cure the breach and the franchisee's failure to cure.77
The court observed that a franchisor possessing a right to supervise the
"internal operations" of the franchisee's enterprise, including the right to veto
unsafe procedures, may be liable for the negligent failure to do soJ 8 To impose
liability, however, this right to veto unsafe procedures must consist of more
than the "general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its
progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which
need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alternatives and devia-
71. Id.
72. This presumably minimizes the risk of injury to third parties. Id. at 239,
373 N.E.2d at 1374.
73. Id. at 240, 373 N.E.2d at 1374.
74. Id. at 241, 373 N.E.2d at 1375. Such supervisory control could not extend
to "operative details," which would have subjected the franchisor to liability on agency
grounds.
75. Noting that the cases concerning franchisor liability for the franchisee's
acts analyze the issue on agency principles, the court turned to cases involving the
liability of employers for the acts of independent contractors for negligent supervision.
Id. at 240, 373 N.E.2d at 1374-75.
76. Id. at 240, 373 N.E.2d at 1374.
77. Id. at 239, 373 N.E.2d at 1374.
78. Id. at 242, 373 N.E.2d at 1375.
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tions. . . ."1 The franchisor's right to demand compliance with the applicable
statutes and to terminate the franchise agreement upon the franchisee's failure
to comply was deemed insufficient to impose liability under either negligence
or agency principles.8"
In Wise v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.,81 an employee of the fran-
chisee was burned by cooking oil from a defective pressure fryer. Vicarious
liability was not asserted. The plaintiff sought to hold the franchisor liable for
negligence under Restatement section 414. In denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the court distinguished Coty on the basis that the in-
strumentality in Wise was purchased with at least the approval if not the di-
rection of the franchisor.82 The fact that the franchisor had developed a "so-
phisticated system for selecting, approving, testing, recommending and
maintaining quality control" over equipment used by the franchisee was con-
sidered significant.8 3 The franchisor was also obligated under the franchise
agreement to inform its franchisees concerning methods of quality control.
Moreover, all franchisees were required to operate in conformity with a confi-
dential operating manual promulgated by the franchisor.8 4 These circum-
stances gave rise to questions of material fact as to the degree of control re-
tained by the franchisor over the franchisee's operation as a whole and over
the franchisee's purchase of cooking equipment in particular.
The court in Wise further held that under general principles of tort law,
Kentucky Fried Chicken might also be liable to the franchisee's employee as
one who voluntarily undertook to act without a duty to do so, and acted in a
negligent manner.85 The franchisor required its franchisees to purchase only
certain brands of cooking equipment, the brand that caused injury was one
recommended by the franchisor, the franchisor reserved the right to review the
quality of equipment, and the franchisor had been notified by the manufac-
turer of the fryer that it contained a defect and took no steps to inform either
the franchisee or its employees of the defect. The court felt that, if proven,
these facts would support a finding that the franchisor had, "at a minimum,"
a duty to warn. Presumably the court was referring to a duty to warn the
franchisee, although the opinion is not clear on this point.88
Coty and Wise are difficult to reconcile. In both cases, the franchisor did
not exercise control over the day-to-day business activities of the franchisee. It
79. Id. at 241, 373 N.E.2d at 1375. Such rights do not, however, provide the
franchisor with effective power over the day-to-day operations of the franchisee.
80. Id. at 242, 373 N.E.2d at 1376. These rights did not provide the franchisor
with the power necessary to minimize the risk of injury, and thus no duty was owed to
the plaintiff.
81. 555 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.H. 1983).
82. Id. at 995.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 995-96.
86. See id. at 996.
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exercised only the general supervision necessary to protect its trademark. 87
Cullen v. BMW of North America, Inc.89 also analyzed franchisor liabil-
ity under negligence principles. In late January, 1979, Cullen paid the full
purchase price of a new BMW automobile to a BMW dealer, Bavarian Auto
Sales, Inc. (Bavarian). Cullen never received the automobile or the return of
his money. Bavarian's president, Hans Eichler, absconded with Cullen's
money. Cullen sued BMW after his suit against Bavarian was stayed due to
Eichler's filing of a bankruptcy petition. Cullen's theories of liability against
BMW included negligence, agency by estoppel, civil conspiracy to commit
fraud, and prima facie tort.89
The evidence revealed that BMW had known for some time that Bavarian
was experiencing financial difficulties. This included knowledge that Bavarian
had issued insufficient funds checks both to BMW and to customers of Bava-
rian. BMW also was aware of Bavarian's inability to maintain the minimum
lines of credit necessary to operate as a BMW dealer. On December 18, 1978,
less than one month before Bavarian's franchise agreement with BMW was to
expire, BMW notified Bavarian that unless Bavarian corrected its continuing
deficiencies within sixty days, it would serve notice to terminate the franchise.
Eichler responded that he wished to continue the dealership. After the expira-
tion of the franchise agreement on December 31, 1978, BMW allowed Bava-
rian to continue holding itself out as an authorized BMW dealership, includ-
ing using the BMW logo and printed materials bearing BMW trademarks. On
February 13, 1979, BMW met with Eichler and learned of his misuse of cus-
tomer funds. BMW accepted Eichler's voluntary resignation three days later. 0
The trial court found that BMW owed a "duty of care" to Cullen and
other BMW customers to avoid subjecting them to unreasonable exposure to
financial injury at the hands of its dealer.91 Reviewing New York law, the trial
court concluded that if a defendant's relationship to the circumstances or the
intervening wrongdoer is such that it has a reasonable opportunity to reduce
the risk of a foreseeable injury, a duty arises to do so:9 2
87. The court in Wise discounted the fact that the franchise agreement pro-
vided that the franchisee would "actively manage the day-to-day operations of the out-
let," and "at all times remain an independent contractor." Id. at 993. The court fo-
cused on other provisions of the agreement as providing the needed control. These
provisions have, however, been recognized by other courts as necessary to protect the
trademark.
88. 531 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 691 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1982).
89. The trial court granted BMW's motion for summary judgment on the con-
spiracy and fraud claims, Cullen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 249(E.D.N.Y. 1980), and entered judgment against plaintiff on the agency theory, finding
an absence of reliance by the plaintiff on the manifestations of authority. Cullen v.
BMW of N. Am., 531 F. Supp. 555, 560 (E.D.N.Y.); rev'd on other grounds, 691 F.2d
1097 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1525 (1983).
90. 691 F.2d at 1100; 531 F. Supp. at 558-59.
91. 531 F. Supp. at 564.
92. Id. at 563.
[Vol. 49
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss2/4
FRANCHISOR LIABILITY
[D]efendant [BMW] acquiesced to circumstances which it should have rea-
sonably known presented a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff. Most impor-
tantly, defendant had both the opportunity and capability to decrease or fore-
close the risk of harm. Therefore, a duty of care arose to avoid subjecting
BMW customers to the unreasonable exposure to financial injury.9 3
This rationale appears to create a duty on the part of the franchisor based
upon the franchisor-franchisee relationship, regardless of the franchisor's di-
rect contacts with the injured third party.
BMW was held negligent for breaching its duty to Cullen, as a customer
of Bavarian, by unreasonably allowing Bavarian to continue operating as a
BMW dealer after the franchise agreement had expired and after BMW had
notice of Eichler's business dealings. BMW was also negligent in failing to
supervise Bavarian's operation after the expiration of the franchise agree-
ment.9 4 BMW contented that its negligence was not the proximate cause of
Cullen's injury because Eichler's conduct constituted an intervening criminal
act. The trial court held that Eichler's acts did not break the causal chain
because BMW's conduct constituted a "substantial causative factor" and
Eichler's conduct was a foreseeable risk of BMW's negligence.95
The Second Circuit reversed and held that even though BMW knew of
Bavarian's precarious financial condition, it was not liable because it could not
have reasonably foreseen Eichler's criminal activity.9 6 The court of appeals
apparently agreed that under certain circumstances a franchisor can be held
liable under a negligence theory for failure to supervise or terminate its fran-
chisee. In this particular case, however, causation was lacking due to the un-
foreseeability of the franchisee's criminal acts.9 7
Although the decisions in Coty and Cullen ultimately were favorable to
the franchisor, both cases present problems which make them precarious pro-
tection for franchisors. A major problem involves their approach to the
franchisor's right to terminate upon the franchisee's breach of the franchise
agreement. In Cullen, the court seemed to view the franchisor's right to termi-
nate a sufficient and appropriate means of reducing the risk of harm to third
parties due to malfeasance of the franchisee. The failure by the franchisor to
93. Id. BMW's "capability to decrease or foreclose the risk of harm" was based
on its right to terminate the franchise. But cf. Coty v. United States Slicing Mach. Co.,
58 Ill. App. 3d 237, 242, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1376 (1978) (general right to terminate is
an ineffective tool for exercising control over the franchisee's operation and thus is
insufficient to create vicarious liability).
94. 531 F. Supp. at 564.
95. Id. at 564-66.
96. 691 F.2d at 1101.
97. Id. Although the Second Circuit seemed to recognize the possibility of a
franchisor being held liable for negligently failing to terminate a dealer, a prior state-
ment in the opinion is contrary: "We agree with BMW that it did not owe a duty to
supervise the operation of Bavarian and to terminate the franchise because of its alleg-
edly precarious financial condition." Id. at 1098.
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terminate could subject the franchisor to liability under a negligence theory. 8
The Coty court, in contrast, considered the mere right to terminate an unvi-
able method of minimizing the risk of injury to third parties. The court indi-
cated that, where the franchisor lacks the power to become directly involved in
the risk created by the franchisee, it is inappropriate to impose a duty on the
franchisor to third parties who may be injured by the franchisee.
These varying approaches leave much doubt as to the importance of the
franchisor's right to terminate as a means of maintaining control over the
franchisee's acts. The cautious franchisor who retains the right to terminate or
supervise the franchise's operations as permitted by the Lanham Act would be
well advised to diligently exercise its rights.
If a court is intent on holding a franchisor liable, it can easily find ways
to do so. For example, when considering a negligence action brought against a
franchisor by an employee of a franchisee, the court in Wise did not even
mention the right of termination." The court disregarded language in the
franchise agreement holding the franchisee responsible for the day-to-day op-
erations of the business as an independent contractor. Instead, the court relied
on language giving the franchisor the right to require the purchase of the in-
jury producing equipment and providing the franchisee with a duty to operate
in conformity with a manual. The court suggested that these provisions were
sufficient to support liability under Restatement section 414 for failing to exer-
cise control over the franchisee with reasonable care. 00
The vicarious liability and negligence cases are similar in many respects.
In both areas, the control exercised by the franchisor is the key issue. In the
vicarious liability cases, control creates an agency relationship that makes the
manufacturer liable for the acts of its franchisee. The same considerations ap-
pear in the negligence cases where the manufacturer is held liable for failing
to use reasonable care in exercising control over its franchisee. In the negli-
gence cases, the issue of control is considered twice: first, when the court de-
termines whether the franchisor has retained control over any part of the work
of the franchisee sufficient to subject the franchisor to a duty of care (very
close to the agency consideration); second, when the court considers whether
the manufacturer has failed to reasonably exercise the control it has retained.
The results are the same under vicarious liability and negligence theories: the
franchisor is deemed liable for injuries to third parties.
B. Products Liability
Often the franchisor is neither the manufacturer nor seller of the product;
it merely licenses its trademark to a franchisee or licensee who manufactures
98. As discussed in the text accompanying note 96 supra, the Second Circuit
apparently agreed with the trial court's conclusion on this question, although the lan-
guage used does not leave the matter entirely free from doubt.
99. See 555 F. Supp. at 991-96.
100. Id. at 995-96.
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or sells the product. Breach of warranty and strict liability in tort actions have
traditionally been directed against "manufacturers" or "sellers" of defective
products. Courts also have applied these concepts to non-manufacturers and
non-sellers under various rationales. Trademark licensors' liability to third per-
sons under product liability theories can be broken down into breach of war-
ranty and strict liability.
1. Breach of Warranty
The seminal breach of warranty case in the trademark-licensor area is
Kosters v. Seven Up Co.'0' In Kosters, the purchaser of a carton of soft drinks
sustained severe eye damage when a bottle slipped from a defective carton and
exploded. The consumer sued the soft drink franchisor urging various theories
of liability, including breach of implied warranty. Seven-Up, the franchisor,
appealed the $150,000 jury verdict, contending that it could not be held liable
under an implied warranty theory since it did not manufacture, handle, design,
or require use of the carton.102  The Sixth Circuit concluded that Seven-Up
could be held accountable since it not only sponsored, managed, and controlled
the system for distributing the product, it consented to use of the defective
carton. 10 3 The carton was submitted by the local bottler to Seven-Up for in-
spection and the franchisor, knowing of its design, consented to the carton's
use.10 4 The court observed that when a franchisor consents to the distribution
of a defective product bearing its name, the obligation of the franchisor to
compensate the injured consumer for breach of implied warranty arises from
several different factors: (1) the risk created by approving the distribution of
an unsafe product; (2) the franchisor's ability to prevent the loss; (3) the con-
sumer's lack of knowledge of the danger; and (4) the consumer's reliance on
the trade name which gives the intended impression that the franchisor is re-
sponsible for the product.105 Seven-Up's liability was premised on its control
over the product and the public's assumption, induced by the franchisor's con-
duct, that Seven-Up did in fact control and vouch for the product.106
A second breach of warranty case, Harris v. Aluminum Co. of
101. 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979). Although the court spoke in terms of "breach
of warranty," the case really depended upon strict liability in tort. See id. at 353; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
102. The court of appeals framed the issue as whether "Michigan's principles of
strict accountability for breach of implied warranty extended to a franchisor who re-
tains the right of control over the product and specifically consents to its distribution in
the form sold but who does not actually manufacture, sell, handle, ship, or require the
use of the product." 595 F.2d at 352.
103. Id. at 352-53.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 353.
106. Id.; see also Hayward v. Holiday Inns, 459 F.Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1978)
(patron sued motel franchisor for injuries sustained on the franchisee's premises based
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America,10 7 also involved suit brought by a consumer against a soft drink
franchisor. In Harris, a twist-off cap struck the plaintiff in the eye, resulting in
partial blindness. The plaintiff advanced several theories, including breach of
implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, and negligence. The
franchisor's motion for summary judgment was denied on all theories. The
court observed that Kosters provided authority to expand implied warranty
principles to soft drink manufacturers who promote the sale of soft drink prod-
ucts but do not actually manufacture or sell the product. 108 The court found it
significant that the franchisor was responsible for placing the product in the
stream of commerce, had the ability to prevent the damage by eliminating the
defect, and that the consumer had relied on the franchisor's actions. 0 9
2. Restatement (Second) Section 402A
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A applies strict liability only
when the defendant is a seller or manufacturer of the injury-producing prod-
uct."10 Various cases, however, have either ignored or rewritten the seller/
manufacturer requirement. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co."' is illustrative of
decisions where courts have concluded that there is no basis for distinguishing
between a seller or manufacturer and a trademark licensor when both have
benefitted by placing a product in the "stream of commerce." In Kasel, a con-
sumer was injured when ammunition manufactured by Remington's trade-
mark-licensee exploded. The consumer instituted an action against Remington
based on section 402A. Remington argued that it could not be held liable be-
cause it neither manufactured nor sold the ammunition. The court disagreed:
"[A]s long as the franchisor or trademark licensor can be said to be a link in
the marketing enterprise which placed a defective product within the stream
of commerce," there is no reason not to apply strict liability in tort.1'
The court noted that under the "stream-of-commerce" approach, no pre-
cise legal relationship is required between a member of the enterprise that
caused the defective product to be placed in commerce and the injured con-
sumer." 3 Moreover, liability was applied without regard to the individual de-
fendant's control over the cause of the defect, although if such control existed,
it would have been a significant factor in finding liability." 4
Kasel has been followed by other courts. For example, in City of Hart-
107. 550 F. Supp. 1024 (W.D. Va. 1982).
108. Id. at 1027.
109. Id. at 1028.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
111. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
112. Id. at 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
113. Id.
114. Id., 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24. Remington organized the licensee and owned
40% of its stock. Id., at 717-19, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19. It also equipped the licensee,
financed it, shared common officers and directors with it, received substantial revenue
from it, and exercised rights of quality control. Id.
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ford v. Associated Construction Co., 115 the plaintiff sued to recover for prop-
erty damage and expenses resulting from a leaking roof on a school building.
One of the defendants was the trademark-licensor of the roofing base which
was applied to the defective roof. The court observed that, although it found
no cases that applied strict liability in tort "upward" to a franchisor or a
trademark-licensor, there is no logical reason for refusing to apply strict liabil-
ity in tort as long as the franchisor or trademark-licensor is linked to the mar-
keting enterprise that placed a defective product within the stream of com-
merce. "" The licensor retained "extensive" control over the quality, methods,
and manner of application of the product through franchise agreements, and it
sold to its franchisees one of the necessary component materials.1 7 The licen-
sor derived "substantial" profit from the licensing agreements and the sale of
materials to the franchisees."a 8 The finished product carried the licensor's
trademark." 9 Thus, the court overruled the licensor's demurrer that it was not
a seller under section 402A."10
3. Restatement (Second) Section 400
By premising liability on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 400 in-
stead of section 402A, courts eliminate the requirement that the defendant be
a manufacturer or seller. The trademark-licensor that permits use of its trade-
mark by a franchisee in conjunction with the manufacture or sale of a product
is liable under the rationale that "one who puts out as his own product a
chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he
were its manufacturer."' 2 Accordingly, it is probable that the trademark-li-
censor would always be held responsible to a third person for injury caused by
a product bearing his trademark even though the licensor retained little, if
any, control over the manufacturing process.
Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co.122 typifies this line of strict liability
cases. In Carter, the plaintiff was injured when her dress caught fire. Carter
instituted a strict tort action against the non-manufacturing licensor, who al-
115. 34 Conn. Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
116. Id. at 211, 384 A.2d at 394; see Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 I11. 2d 393,
407, 389 N.E.2d 155, 163 (1979) (non-manufacturing trademark-licensor can be a
"seller" under § 400 or § 402A), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980).
117. 34 Conn. Supp. at 208, 384 A.2d at 393.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. In discussing whether the situation met § 402A's condition that the defec-
tive product "is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold," the court discussed at length the Lanham
Act's requirement that the owner of a trademark exercised a certain degree of control
over how the market is used. The court also held that the trademark licensor could be
liable under § 400 as one who placed the product in commerce as his own by permit-
ting his trademark to be affixed thereto. 34 Conn. Supp. at 215, 384 A.2d at 397.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
122. 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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lowed garments made according to its quality standards to carry its authorized
label. Unlike Kasel, the licensor had no ties with the dress manufacturer other
than the license agreement. Bancroft moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, contending that it could not be liable under section 402A because it
was not a "seller" of the defective product.123 Despite Bancroft's limited in-
volvement in the manufacturing process, the court held that it was still suffi-
ciently involved to be liable under section 400 because the authorized label
represented to consumers that Bancroft's specifications had been followed.12
Another case relying upon section 400 is Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc.1 25
Connelly suffered personal injuries when a Uniroyal tire failed while he was
driving his automobile. Uniroyal neither manufactured nor sold the tire, but
licensed the use of its registered trade name "Uniroyal." The tire was manu-
factured by Englebert and sold to General Motors Corporation, which placed
the tire on the automobile when it was assembled. Uniroyal had entered into
an agreement to make available to its licensee, Englebert, detailed information
concerning the methods, processes, and formulas used in the manufacture of
tires and to also supply technical services and instruction. Englebert made
quarterly payments to Uniroyal for the license and was specifically authorized
to publicize the fact that it employed manufacturing and technical methods
used by Uniroyal. Englebert was also required to advise Uniroyal as to the
nature of the goods and manufacturing operations being associated with the
Uniroyal trademark. 26
The court observed that the cases applying section 400 to non-manufac-
turers who hold themselves out as manufacturers all involve some degree of
participation in the chain of distribution by the non-manufacturer. 127 Never-
theless, the court held that participation in the distribution of the product is
not an essential element for application of section 400.128 A trademark-licensor
is an integral part of the marketing enterprise and participates in the profits
reaped by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce. Thus, the
same policies that justify applying section 400 to wholesalers, retailers, and
lessors apply equally to a trademark-licensor. 129
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1106-07..
125. 75 I11. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 410, 389 N.E.2d at 162.
128. Id. at 410-11, 389 N.E.2d at 162-63.
129. The court observed:
The societal purposes underlying Suvada mandate that the doctrine be appli-
cable to one who, for a consideration, authorizes the use of his trademark,
particularly when, as here, the product bears no indication that it was manu-
factured by any other entity. The fact that the defendant may not have been
a link in the chain of distribution is wholly irrelevant for as the court, refer-
ring to a seller, contractor or supplier, said in Suvada, 'lack of privity of con-
tract not being a defense in a tort action against the manufacturer, it is not a
defense in an action against any of these parties.'
[Vol. 49332
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In Hebel v. Sherman Equipment Co.,130 the plaintiff injured his foot in a
conveyor that was part of a car washing system. Hebel, who was working as
an attendant when he suffered the injury, sued the manufacturer, Sherman
Equipment Co., under section 400. Haverberg, another defendant, had assem-
bled the car washing equipment from various component parts, placed its
name on the system, and sold it to the Glenbrook Service Station, where Hebel
was working when he was injured. Although Sherman manufactured most of
the component parts, it did not manufacture the conveyor drive chain, which
injured the plaintiff. Sherman's name appeared on the parts it had manufac-
tured and on brochures which had been composed and distributed by
Haverberg to the purchaser. 13'
Sherman received summary judgment on the ground that it did not man-
ufacture, design, or sell the conveyor. 132 The appellate court reversed, finding
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Sherman held itself
out to be the manufacturer of the conveyor drive mechanism. 3 3 The court
observed that Connelly and Suvada v. White Motor Co."4 mandate that the
strict tort liability doctrine be applied to "one who, for a consideration, autho-
rizes the use of his trademark, 'particularly when . . . the product bears no
indication that it was manufactured by any other entity.' ,,35 The court, ap-
parently relying upon Illinois common law and without reference to section
400, found that no difference exists "between the liability of a manufacturer
and the liability of one who holds himself out to be the apparent
manufacturer.' 36
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed"37 and distinguished Kosters, Con-
nelly, and Kasel."38 In addressing the "apparent manufacturer" or "holding
out" doctrine that had developed in Illinois, the court observed that this spe-
cies of estoppel developed originally as a basis for imposing tort liability based
upon "apparent manufacturers" and was subsequently subsumed by section
400."31 The supreme court found the lower court's analysis faulty for concen-
trating upon appearances to the injured party and not to the purchaser of the
product. 140 The court concluded that the purchaser (Glenbrook Standard Sta-
Id. at 411-12, 389 N.E.2d at 163.
130. 100 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 427 N.E.2d 967 (1981), rev'd, 92 Ill. 2d 368, 442
N.E.2d 199 (1982).
131. 92 Ill. 2d at 869-70, 442 N.E.2d at 200-01; 100 Ill. App. 3d 1056-59, 427
N.E.2d at 968-70.
132. 100 I11. App. 3d at 1055-59; 427 N.E.2d at 968-71.
133. Id. at 1059, 427 N.E.2d at 972.
134. 32 I11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
135. 100 II1. App. 3d at 1059-60, 427 N.E.2d at 971.
136. Id. at 1060, 427 N.E.2d at 971.
137. 92 II1. 2d 368, 442 N.E.2d 199 (1982).
138. Id. at 371, 442 N.E.2d at 203.
139. Id.
140. The court referred to whether a "reasonable purchaser" would rely upon
the appearance that Sherman had manufactured the equipment because parts of the
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tion) would not have believed either from the appearance of the equipment
bearing Sherman's name or from advertisements published by Haverberger",
that Sherman manufactured the injury-producing equipment.1 42
IV. CONCLUSION
Franchisor liability has traditionally been based on agency theories, both
actual and apparent. Control, sometimes described as control beyond that nec-
essary to prevent abandonment of the registered mark or name under the Lan-
ham Act, is the key to finding actual agency. Apparent agency is based on the
franchisor's "holding out" of the franchisee as being part of one business en-
tity (by means of the trademark, advertising, or architecture), and the con-
sumer's reasonable reliance on the franchisor's representations.
If the franchisor exercises too little control, his trademark may be deemed
abandoned and the franchise system will be in jeopardy. If the franchisor exer-
cises too much control, he may become vicariously liable for the acts of his
franchisee. A franchise agreement reserving to the franchisor only those con-
trols necessary to protect the trademark, such as control over the quality and
uniformity of the franchised product or service, and perhaps control over uni-
formity of business identity, should not create an agency relationship with the
franchisee. Controls that go beyond protection of the trademark and allow the
franchisor to effectively run the business may provide a basis for a principal-
agent relationship. Courts seldom agree on what constitutes "excessive" con-
trol. In the few cases where the Lanham Act has been raised as a defense to a
claim of actual agency, franchisors have been much more successful in avoid-
ing vicarious liability than in those cases where the franchisor merely at-
tempted to minimize the elements of control without raising the requirements
of the Act.
Injured third persons also have attempted to hold franchisors directly lia-
ble. Under certain circumstances, a franchisor may be held to have breached a
duty of care owed to the consumer (such as the duty to supervise and control
the franchisee), thus making the franchisor directly liable for its own negli-
gence. When the injury is caused by a defective product, strict liability con-
cepts, such as breach of warranty and strict liability in tort, may apply to a
non-manufacturing fran~hisor or trademark licensor. The emerging theories of
products liability seem to share the view that when a trademark-licensor
(franchisor), through its trademark, advertising, and other manifestations,
machine bore its name. Id., 442 N.E.2d at 203. The court also considered whether the
advertising brochures "would mislead the reasonable purchaser of car washing machin-
ery as to the identity of the manufacturer." Id. at 377, 442 N.E.2d at 204.
141. The court found it significant that Haverberger, not Sherman, disseminated
the advertising. The court could find "no case in which a defendant was held to have a
manufacturer's liability based upon another party's representations in advertising that
the defendant was the manufacturer." Id. at 377, 442 N.E.2d at 204.
142. Id. at 379-80, 442 N.E.2d at 203-04.
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places a product in the stream of commerce and represents to consumers that
the product or service is of a certain uniformity and quality, the franchisor
should be held liable on the same basis as a manufacturer. Regardless of
whether breach of warranty, section 402A or section 400 is used, the result is
the same: the trademark-licensor is held directly responsible to a third person
for injury caused by a product manufactured and sold by its franchisee.
These theories create a rather formidable mine field through which a
franchisor-licensor must walk in maintaining the integrity of the franchise
while avoiding responsibility for the acts of its franchisees. At the very least, a
franchisor who does no more than is required by the Lanham Act in control-
ling its franchise system should be able to avoid being held liable for the acts
of its franchsees.
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